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 1 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
Amici are Catholic organizations that represent the interests of 
Catholic laity and workers. Amici write in support of Plaintiff-Appellant to 
provide the Second Circuit with context about the devastating consequences 
for lay Catholic workers if the district court’s decision is upheld. They 
respectfully urge this Court to reverse the district court’s ruling that a lay 
Catholic school principal is a minister for purposes of the First 
Amendment’s ministerial exception. The Amicus Curiae brief includes the 
following organizations: 
 
Call To Action is one of the largest organizations working for 
equality and justice in the Catholic Church today. With over 25,000 
members and supporters and 50 chapters nationally, Call To Action 
educates, inspires, and activates Catholics to act for justice and build 
inclusive communities. In doing so, Call To Action does not condone 
discrimination on the basis of sexual identity, conscience decisions, and/or 
personal decision-making that does not conform to institutional Catholic 
dictates. 
 
DignityUSA is an organization of Catholics committed to justice, 
equality, and full inclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people 
in our Church and society. We support clear and fair employment policies 
for all people, including those who work for Catholic institutions, that 
protect those employees from discrimination on the basis of age, gender, 
sexual orientation, marital status, disability, religion, decisions of 
conscience, or any other factor, and that provide for clear and fair appeal 
processes in the event of discipline or dismissal. 
 
FutureChurch is a twenty-six year old organization with outreach to 
nearly 25,000 members, donors, activists, and participants, promoting the 
rights and responsibilities of  all the baptized in the Roman Catholic Church.  
We work for just treatment for all church workers, educators, theologians, 
                                                            
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.  29(c)(5), the undersigned states that no party’s 
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel 
contributed to funding the preparation or the submission of this brief. 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties to this appeal have consented to 
the filing of this amici curiae brief. 
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ministers, and lay employees.  Just treatment for Church workers is core to 
FutureChurch’s “Justice in the Church” Initiative, which seeks to provide 
immediate resources and advice for ministers and employees who have been 
silenced, fired, or otherwise treated unjustly. As an organization we:  
provide resources documenting the rights and responsibilities of Catholics as 
identified in Church documents and referrals to those who can help; 
document and uncover unjust treatment of Church ministers and employees; 
and honor dioceses/parishes with good practices and structures for Church 
ministers and employees.    
 
FutureChurch believes that as Catholics who love the Church and 
want to see it flourish for years to come, we must preserve the integrity of 
our faith tradition as we face the many challenges of our times. Church law 
clearly tells us it is our right and sometimes our duty to speak out about 
matters that concern the good of the Church. (Canon 212.3).   The Vatican II 
document, Gaudium et Spes, reminds us that with respect to the fundamental 
rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or cultural, 
whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language or religion, is  
to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent (29). 
FutureChurch affirms the dignity and rights of all human beings, rejects 
discrimination of every sort, including discrimination based on sex, gender, 
race, and sexual orientation.   
 
The National Coalition of American Nuns (NCAN) is a national 
Catholic organization of women religious dedicated to working, studying, 
and speaking out on justice issues in church and society since 1969. Its 300 
members are individual women religious in Roman Catholic congregations 
of nuns in the United States. NCAN prioritizes such issues as poverty, 
workers’ rights, environmental responsibility, women’s equality, and respect 
and justice for all marginalized peoples. 
 
New Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of justice and 
reconciliation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender people and the wider 
Catholic Church. In our 39-year history, we have worked with hundreds of 
parishes, schools, colleges, hospitals, religious communities of vowed men 
and women, promoting greater equality for LGBT people.  Recently, we 
have been involved with numerous cases where LGBT people and their 
allies have been fired from Catholic institutions due to their support for 
marriage equality and other issues.  Because we value the Catholic teaching 
on the inherent human dignity of all people, as well as the teaching that 
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promotes justice for workers, we strongly support the right of church 
employees to due process when disputes occur. Catholic church employees 
do not forgo their U.S. civil rights when employed by church institutions. 
 
Voice of the Faithful is a movement of faithful Catholics that started 
in the basement of a church in response to the sexual abuse crisis in the 
Church and has grown to a worldwide movement of 30,000 members 
dedicated to their mission of providing a prayerful voice, attentive to the 
Spirit, through which the faithful can actively participate in the governance 
and guidance of the Catholic Church. 
 
Drawing on our baptismal responsibility for the life and work of the 
Church, VOTF members commit themselves to supporting survivors; 
supporting priests who are helping to heal survivors and correct institutional 
flaws in the Church; and working to reform governing structures so that 
abuse of authority could never happen again. 
 
Nourished by its members’ deep love for the Body of Christ, VOTF 
seeks full transparency and accountability in Church governance and full 
incorporation of lay Catholics in the life and work of the Church at every 
level. 
 
Attendant to full lay participation in the Church, VOTF promotes 
equality of all faithful in the life and work of the Church and abhors 
discrimination of any kind that thwarts the faithful in their pursuit of that 
work. As the faithful have secured rights and responsibilities resulting from 
their baptism, so VOTF holds church institutions accountable for addressing 
those rights and responsibilities in light of the church’s most prized values. 
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 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
Appellant Joanne Fratello is a lay Catholic by faith and a lay principal 
by contract. The district court recognized those two facts, finding “[t]here is 
no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not 
be considered a minister for purposes of Church governance.” Fratello v. 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, No. 12-CV-7359 (CS), 2016 WL 
1249609, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016). Yet the court nonetheless 
transformed Fratello into a minister, ruling that “the issue here is one of 
U.S., not canon, law, and ‘minister’ for purposes of the ministerial exception 
has a far broader meaning than it does for internal Church purposes.” Id. 
Relying on this misinterpretation of the ministerial exception, the court 
mistakenly dismissed Appellant’s Title VII gender discrimination and 
retaliation claims and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
related New York State breach of contract claim. Id. at *13.  
With those words the district court risked turning every employee of 
faith into a minister unprotected by the nation’s race, national origin, gender, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual 
harassment antidiscrimination laws. In doing so, the court misread the 
Supreme Court’s ministerial exception precedent, Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), 
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in two ways. First, it misapplied the Court’s four-part test of ministerial 
status to label Fratello a minister even though she had never taken any active 
steps toward ministry. Second, it ignored the Supreme Court’s statements 
about breach of contract lawsuits and the relevance of Fratello’s “lay 
principal” contract status to the ministerial-exception discussion.  
By holding that U.S. law creates a minister out of a lay principal, the 
court also ran afoul of both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The 
district court offended the Establishment Clause by giving an absolute 
preference to employers’ religious beliefs over their employees’ beliefs and 
contractual expectations. The district court also violated Fratello’s Free 
Exercise rights by ordaining her even though she had never chosen 
ministerial status, received ministerial training, or held herself out as a 
minister. 
The district court’s broad ruling threatens the employment status of 
12,268 Catholic school principals and teachers in New York State alone, 
who could lose the protection of the state and federal race, national origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual 
harassment antidiscrimination laws. See THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC 
DIRECTORY 1, 171-98, 866, 943, 1134-53, 1410, 1538-72 (P.J. Kenedy and 
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Sons, 2015). Joanne Fratello is entitled to her day in court. Therefore, the 
Amici respectfully ask this Court to reverse the ruling of the district court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The district court misinterpreted Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), in two 
ways. 
 
Joanne Fratello’s facts and circumstances in this case were nothing 
like the situation of Cheryl Perich, the Lutheran schoolteacher whom the 
Supreme Court found to be a minister in Hosanna-Tabor. The district court 
misapplied the four Hosanna factors to Fratello, a non-ministerial school 
employee, and underestimated the importance of Appellant’s contract title: 
lay principal. 
A. The district court misapplied the four-factor test of Hosanna-
Tabor, which emphasizes “the formal title given … by the Church, 
the substance reflected in that title, [the employee’s] own use of 
that title, and the important religious functions she performed for 
the Church” to an employee who had never taken any steps 
toward ministry. 
 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court for the first time 
recognized a ministerial exception, grounded in the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment, that requires the dismissal of some employment 
discrimination lawsuits by ministers against their religious employers. The 
case involved a “commissioned” teacher at a Lutheran elementary school, 
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Cheryl Perich, who was fired when she tried to return to work after a 
medical leave of absence for narcolepsy. Id. at 700. Perich alleged retaliation 
under the Americans With Disabilities Act. Id. 
The Opinion of the Court did not adopt a bright-line test identifying 
who qualifies as a minister for ministerial exception purposes, and 
announced its reluctance “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an 
employee qualifies as a minister.” Id. at 707. The Court’s ruling in Hosanna-
Tabor was heavily fact-dependent. Instead of a bright-line test, the Court 
summarized the four issues relevant to Perich’s ministerial status: “the 
formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, 
her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed 
for the Church.” Id. at 708.  
About those four issues, the Court was detailed in its inclusion of the 
facts of Perich’s case. Perich held the official title, “Minister of Religion, 
Commissioned,” spelled out on her “diploma of vocation,” and was 
reviewed by her congregation for her “skills of ministry,” “ministerial 
responsibilities,” and “continuing education as a professional person in the 
ministry of the Gospel.” Id. at 707. Perich also had significant religious 
training (eight college-level courses and oral examinations) as well as an 
official commissioning (requiring endorsement by the local synod, letters of 
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recommendation, a personal statement, written answers to ministry-related 
questions, and election by a congregation). Id.  
The Court noted that “Perich held herself out as a minister of the 
Church,” not only by accepting the church’s call to service and describing 
herself as a minister at Hosanna-Tabor, but also by claiming a housing 
allowance on her tax return that was available only to members of the 
ministry. Id. at 707-708. Moreover, “Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a 
minister” by issuing her a “diploma of vocation” and titling her “Minister of 
Religion, Commissioned.” Id. Finally, “Perich's job duties reflected a role in 
conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission. … As a source 
of religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting 
the Lutheran faith to the next generation.” Id. at 708.  
In stark contrast to Perich, Appellant Joanne Fratello is a lay Catholic, 
who was originally hired as a lay teacher. She had the formal title “lay 
principal,” was held out by the school as a principal, possessed secular 
educational training in school administration, and never “held herself out as 
a minister” of the church or claimed tax benefits available only to ministers 
and clergy. She has no training or education in ministry, theology, or 
religious studies, and applied for a principal’s job requiring a Master’s or 
equivalent degree in education. Fratello Rule 56.1 Stmt, see also Herx v. 
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Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind. 
2014) appeal dismissed, 772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The Diocese hasn't 
shown that Mrs. Herx’s teaching qualifications or job responsibilities in any 
way compare to Ms. Perich’s situation. Nothing in the summary judgment 
record suggests that Mrs. Herx was a member of the clergy of the Catholic 
Church. Mrs. Herx has never led planning for a Mass, hasn’t been ordained 
by the Catholic Church, hasn’t held a title with the Catholic Church, has 
never had (and wasn’t required to have) any religious instruction or training 
to be a teacher at the school, has never held herself out as a priest or 
minister, and was considered by the principal to be a ‘lay teacher.’”); 
Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 136 F. Supp. 3d 
1094, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Catholic high school teacher was not a 
minister even though she spent one out of her five class periods on Campus 
Ministry duties because her degree was a Bachelor of Science in biology and 
not related in any way to theology or religion).  
The district court described at length Fratello’s work duties and 
erroneously concluded that her leadership role in the school made Fratello a 
minister. In fact, her leadership role made her a successful lay principal – 
just as the words of Appellees’ job advertisement and Appellant’s contract 
stated.  
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B. The district court underestimated the importance of the 
contract language identifying Appellant as a “lay principal.”  
 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court explicitly stated it “express[ed] no view 
on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by 
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious 
employers.” Id. at 710.  
The Supreme Court’s breach of contract language in Hosanna-Tabor 
is significant. Pre- and post-Hosanna-Tabor, state and federal courts have 
repeatedly held that a “church is always free to burden its activities 
voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in 
civil court.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf., 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871)). “Even cases 
that rejected ministers’ discrimination claims have noted that churches 
nonetheless ‘may be held liable upon their valid contracts.’” Id. (quoting 
Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 
(4th Cir. 1985)); see also Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by 
consideration, in no way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's 
free exercise rights. Accordingly, application of state law to . . . contract 
claim[s] would not violate the Free Exercise Clause”); Crymes v. Grace 
Hope Presbyterian Church, Inc., No. 2011–CA–000746–MR, 2012 WL 
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3236290 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012); Second Episcopal District African 
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Prioleau, 49 A.3d 812 (D.C. 2012) (post-
Hosanna cases allowing ministerial breach of contract claims to proceed). 
Hosanna-Tabor did not change that fundamental principle. If 
ministers can sue churches for breach of contract then a fortiori can a lay 
principal sue a private school that includes teachers, staff, and students of 
diverse religious identities. The principle of holding employers to their 
contracts applies in this case. That principle carries over to Appellant’s Title 
VII case because the contract determines Fratello’s lay principal, non-
ministerial status for Title VII purposes. St. Anthony’s School sought, hired, 
and contracted with a lay principal with education and experience in school 
administration and held her out as such. Neither the school nor the court can 
transform her into a minister in defiance of the parties’ contractual 
agreement. “Deeming Mrs. [Fratello] a ‘minister’ of the Catholic Church 
would expand the scope of the ministerial exception too far and, in fact, 
would moot the religious exemptions of Title VII.” Herx, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 
1177. 
The district court mistakenly held that the school’s requirement that 
the principal be a practicing Catholic transformed Appellant into a minister. 
That ruling was incorrect on the facts of this case and is dangerous as a 
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precedent for future academic employment disputes. Ms. Fratello’s ecclesial 
status as a lay practicing Catholic is nothing like that of ordained Catholic 
priest Father Justinian Rweyemamu, whom this Court decided “easily falls” 
within the ministerial exception. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d 
Cir. 2008). This Court has repeatedly recognized the distinction between 
ordained Catholic clergy and lay Catholic employees who sue for 
discrimination, recognizing that as a general rule “we will permit lay 
employees—but perhaps not religious employees—to bring discrimination 
suits against their religious employers.” Id. at 207; see also DeMarco v. Holy 
Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing a lay Catholic high 
school math teacher to pursue an Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) case); Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of New York v. 
Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1162 (2d Cir. 1985) (First Amendment does not 
“prohibit the New York State Labor Relations Board from exercising 
jurisdiction over the labor relations between parochial schools and their lay 
teachers”).  
Nonetheless, the district court completely erased the distinction 
between lay and ordained Catholics with its sweeping statement that 
although Appellant was unquestionably not a minister within her own 
church, “the issue here is one of U.S., not canon, law, and ‘minister’ for 
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purposes of the ministerial exception has a far broader meaning than it does 
for internal Church purposes.” Fratello at *12. Such court-imposed ministry 
in defiance of ecclesial and contract status would have devastating 
consequences for the 12,268 Catholic schoolteachers and principals in New 
York State and the 14,831 Catholic educators who work within the Second 
Circuit. See KENEDY at 1-66, 171-98, 214, 553, 866, 943, 1134-53, 1410, 
1538-72. Thus countless thousands of Americans could lose the protection 
of the nation’s race, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, pregnancy, equal pay, and sexual harassment antidiscrimination 
laws.  
Recently Catholic high school teachers in San Francisco – with the 
vocal support of significant numbers of Catholic lay parents and lay Catholic 
politicians from the State Assembly and the Board of Supervisors – 
vigorously rejected their archbishop’s request to sign new employment 
contracts labeling all teachers as ministers. Those California teachers 
understood that such contract language inaccurately characterized both their 
ecclesial status and their jobs. They knew they were lay teachers seeking 
academic excellence for students, not ordained priests offering pastoral 
ministry to parishioners. Those teachers also recognized that such contract 
wording “could exempt them from federal anti-discrimination law in the 
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event of dismissal.” Lee Romney, Faculty, Staff at S.F. Archdiocese Schools 
Sign Petition Rejecting Archbishop’s Additions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2015, at 
B3. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors warned that contracts 
arbitrarily redefining teachers as ministers were “contrary to shared San 
Francisco values of non-discrimination, women’s rights, inclusion, and 
equality for all humans.” Id. at B6.  
An Indiana district court similarly cautioned that labeling Catholic lay 
teacher Emily Herx a minister “based on her attendance and participation in 
prayer and religious services with her students, which was done in a 
supervisory capacity, would greatly expand the scope of the ministerial 
exception and ultimately would qualify all of the Diocese's teachers as 
ministers, a position rejected by the Hosanna–Tabor Court.” Herx, 48 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1177 (emphasis added); see also Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., 
No. NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042, at *11 (Mass. Super. Dec. 16, 
2015) (“[t]o apply the ‘ministerial’ exception here would allow all religious 
schools to exempt all of their employees from employment discrimination 
laws simply by calling their employees ministers. If that were the rule, most 
of the discussion in Hosanna–Tabor would have been unnecessary.”). 
Like the San Francisco and Indiana teachers, Fratello never thought of 
herself as a minister or held herself out as a minister. She signed her contract 
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to be a lay principal. Yet the district court saw the words “lay principal” in 
her employment contract and read them to mean “minister.” By the district 
court’s reasoning, every single one of the 60 million lay practicing Catholics 
in the United States is potentially a minister who is unprotected by the 
nation’s most fundamental federal and state antidiscrimination laws. Indeed, 
even non-Catholics may be at risk; at least one Catholic Archdiocese has 
argued that a non-Catholic teacher qualified for the ministerial exception. 
See Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 
360355 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (rejecting ministerial exception defense in 
case of non-Catholic computer technology coordinator fired for pregnancy).  
In practice, the district court deferred completely to Defendants’ 
ministerial characterization of Ms. Fratello. Yet only one Justice in 
Hosanna-Tabor – Justice Thomas – ruled that courts must adopt the 
religious employer’s characterization of the employee. Hosanna–Tabor, 132 
S. Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring). In contrast, this Court has properly 
interpreted the controlling opinion of the Court in Hosanna-Tabor to require 
a court “to make its own determination whether the plaintiff was a minister 
subject to the ministerial exception.” Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of 
Educ. of City of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 204 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1730 (2015) (emphasis added). If a school said a janitor was a 
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minister, for example, “the court would have to determine whether under the 
actual law of the church in question (and not as a subterfuge) janitors really 
were ministers.” Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 
1039 (7th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Hosanna-Tabor, 132 
S. Ct. at 709, n. 4; see also Alcazar v. Corporation of the Catholic 
Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010) (“we agree with 
the courts that have held that, if a church labels a person a religious official 
as a mere ‘subterfuge’ to avoid statutory obligations, the ministerial 
exception does not apply.”). It is an open secret that many religious 
organizations are seeking new means to redescribe their employees as 
ministers so that they can fire LGBT and other suspect employees without 
legal repercussion. See, e.g., ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, PROTECTING 
YOUR MINISTRY FROM SEXUAL ORIENTATION GENDER IDENTITY LAWSUITS: 
A LEGAL GUIDE FOR SOUTHERN BAPTIST AND EVANGELICAL CHURCHES, 
SCHOOLS, AND MINISTRIES 12 (2015) (“When feasible, a religious 
organization should assign its employees duties that involve ministerial, 
teaching, or other spiritual qualifications – duties that directly further the 
religious mission. For example, if a church receptionist answers the phone, 
the job description might detail how the receptionist is required to answer 
basic questions about the church’s faith, provide religious resources, or pray 
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with callers. Consider requiring all employees to participate in devotional or 
prayer time, or to even lead these on occasion.”); Ian Millhiser, Christian 
Denomination Plans to Avoid Civil Rights Laws By Pretending Receptionists 
Are “Ministers,” THINKPROGRESS.ORG, Jun. 13, 2015, at 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/06/13/3668626/inside-southern-baptist-
conventions-devious-plan-defeat-anti-discrimination-laws/ (The “Protecting 
Your Ministry manual instructs religious employers to layer religious duties 
on top of each of their employees’ actual job descriptions in an effort to 
convince courts that every single one of these employees qualifies as a 
minister.”). 
This Court must not support the subterfuge that dismissed this case. 
Under the actual law of the church in question in this case, Joanne Fratello is 
not a minister. The ministerial exception of the First Amendment does not 
authorize the district court to ordain her to ministry. Indeed such ordination 
violates both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.  
II.  The district court’s reasoning violated both Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment by creating an absolute preference for 
religious employers over employees without any regard for 
employees’ rights. 
 
The rule of the Free Exercise Clause is that everyone must comply 
with “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability.” Employment Div., 
Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). Neither 
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this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that any religious conduct, 
including the ministerial exception, is absolutely protected in all 
circumstances by the First Amendment. Although the freedom to believe “is 
absolute,” the freedom to act “cannot be. Conduct remains subject to 
regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see also Rector, Wardens, & Members of 
Vestry of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 
(2d Cir. 1990) (government “may restrict certain activities associated with 
the practice of religion pursuant to its general regulatory powers.”).  
Nonetheless, the district court interpreted the ministerial exception to 
swallow Smith’s free exercise rule. The court created an unconstitutionally 
absolute right to harmful conduct when it concluded that Fratello’s actual 
religious identity and beliefs were irrelevant to its ministerial exception 
analysis. That absolute preference for employers’ over employees’ religious 
freedom violates both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the 
First Amendment and contradicts Hosanna-Tabor’s reasoning. See, e.g., 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 706 (1985) (Connecticut law 
giving employees an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their 
Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786–87 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Among 
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the reasons the United States is so open, so tolerant, and so free is that no 
person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or 
her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other 
persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the 
law deems compelling.”). The Religion Clauses require equal consideration 
of Appellant’s and Appellees’ religious freedom interests. Yet the district 
court’s analysis ignored this balance of freedoms by completely tipping the 
scale toward Appellees. 
When the Hosanna-Tabor Court recognized that the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment compel a ministerial exception, only Justice Thomas 
suggested that courts should defer to the employer’s characterization of the 
employee as a minister. Hosanna–Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 711 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). Eight Justices rejected the idea that religious employers deserve 
absolute immunity from employment discrimination claims. See id. at 694; 
see also Bronx Household, 750 F.3d at 204 (Hosanna-Tabor requires a court 
“to make its own determination whether the plaintiff was a minister subject 
to the ministerial exception.”). 
Hosanna-Tabor is consistent with the Court’s Establishment Clause 
precedents, which prohibit states from conferring absolute benefits on some 
religious actors at the expense of third parties’ rights. In Estate of Thornton 
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v. Caldor, Inc., for example, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that 
gave Sabbatarians an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath because the 
statute took “no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or 
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.” 472 U.S. at 709. In 
Caldor, the Court approvingly identified “a fundamental principle of the 
Religion Clauses, so well-articulated by Judge Learned Hand” in this Court 
in 1953: 
 “The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in 
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his 
own religious necessities.”  
Id. at 710 (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d 
Cir. 1953)). Similarly, in United States v. Lee, the Court rejected Amish 
employers’ requests for exemption from paying social security taxes because 
the exemption “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees.” 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
Since Caldor, the Court has repeatedly held that an “unyielding 
weighting in favor of [religious organizations] over all other interests” 
violates the Establishment Clause. 472 U.S. at 710; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 722 (2005). The Court has consistently considered the effects of 
religious accommodations on the well-being of third parties whose interests 
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might be affected by the accommodation. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720 (citing 
Caldor) (in RLUIPA context, courts “must take adequate account of the 
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”). 
The Court always weighs the proposed actions of First Amendment 
rights holders against potential harm to third parties because “[a]t some 
point, accommodation [of religious freedom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful 
fostering of religion’” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). This unlawful point was reached 
when the district court gave Appellees an absolute and unqualified immunity 
by dismissing Appellant’s lawsuit even though “[t]here is no dispute that 
Plaintiff is not a member of the clergy and that she would not be considered 
a minister for purposes of Church governance.” Fratello at *12. In defiance 
of the First Amendment, the district court gave Appellees an “absolute and 
unqualified” exemption where “religious concerns automatically control 
over all secular interests in the workplace,” “no matter what burden or 
inconvenience this imposes on the . . .  workers.”  Caldor, 472 U.S. at 708-
09.  
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The burden on Joanne Fratello in this case, however, was no mere 
inconvenience. Instead, this lay principal’s free exercise rights were 
completely eradicated. “The free exercise of religion means, first and 
foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one 
desires.” Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 877; Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. 
& Canada v. New York City Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 
183, 193 (2d Cir. 2014). In Religion Clause jurisprudence, there is 
“widespread agreement that religious faith and practice should be voluntary. 
… Each person decides for himself or herself what to believe.” Christopher 
C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1197 (2014) (emphasis added); see also 
Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1511 (D. Colo. 1989), aff'd, 921 
F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (“the goal of the Free Exercise Clause is to keep 
religious faith voluntary”).  
Joanne Fratello is voluntarily a lay Catholic by faith and a lay 
principal by contract. “There is no dispute that Plaintiff is not a member of 
the clergy and that she would not be considered a minister for purposes of 
Church governance.” Fratello at *12. The Religion Clauses forbid the court 
to impose ministerial status on her without her consent. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 
261. 
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The ministerial exception protects churches and their ministers who 
voluntarily agree to perform religious functions and promote religious goals 
together. Churches are not exempt, however, from adhering to their 
“completely voluntary” contractual obligations. Petruska, 462 F.3 at 310. 
Appellant has never taken any voluntary steps toward ministry. She has 
secular training and signed a contract as a lay principal. Thus, the court-
imposed ministry that dismissed her case is beyond the pale of the First 
Amendment, which requires the Appellees to obey the valid, neutral, and 
general antidiscrimination laws prohibiting gender discrimination. “To 
permit [Appellees to have absolute immunity from antidiscrimination laws] 
would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the 
law of the land, and in effect to permit every [private school, hospital, 
university, or social service agency] to become a law unto [them]sel[ves].” 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The First Amendment expressly prohibits that 
outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The consequences of affirming the district court’s decision in this case 
would be catastrophic for the 14,831 Catholic educators in New York State 
and the Second Circuit, who, like Ms. Fratello, could lose the protection of 
the nation’s antidiscrimination laws by being ordained to a ministerial status 
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they never held. If the district court’s reasoning is upheld, every practicing 
lay Catholic employee in the country could be transformed into a minister 
devoid of employment rights and outside the protection of the nation’s race, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, pregnancy, equal 
pay, and sexual harassment antidiscrimination laws. Therefore, Amici 
respectfully request this Court to reverse the ruling of the district court and 
allow Appellant her day in court. 
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